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Since the mid-1980s, unemployment rates in Ireland and the Netherlands have plummeted, while
the average rate for the European Union has maintained its longtime high level. Ambitious labor
market reforms—including wage moderation and the tightening of unemployment benefits—
have helped to bring the Irish and Dutch rates down. Other European countries would benefit
from adopting similar reforms, but they are unlikely to see the same dramatic improvement in
their unemployment numbers.
The average unemployment rate in the European Union
has remained stubbornly high for the past twenty years.
Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, the average
rate soared from about 2 percent to more than 10 per-
cent (Chart 1). After easing somewhat at the end of the
1980s, it hovered between 9 and 11 percent for most of
the 1990s before dropping to 8.2 percent last year. But
while the high average rate across Europe has proved
difficult to subdue, two members of the European
Union—Ireland and the Netherlands—have managed to
cut unemployment sharply during the period, bringing
their rates to levels under the low 4.5 percent rate 
currently prevailing in the United States.
How have these two countries escaped the high
unemployment rates bedeviling Europe as a whole?
Over the past two decades, most European countries
have undertaken some labor market reforms. Ireland
and the Netherlands, however, have made the deepest
and most widespread changes in their wage and work
policies. The reforms enacted include wage moderation,
income tax cuts, the tightening of unemployment bene-
fits, and reductions in barriers to part-time work.
In this edition of Current Issues, we assess the extent
to which the Irish and Dutch reforms have helped lower
the unemployment rates in these two countries. We draw
on existing academic research to evaluate the effect of
the reforms, and we consider in addition how the timing
of the reforms may have shaped their impact. After
reviewing labor market developments within these
countries, we go on to ask whether the Irish and Dutch
reforms could be instructive for other European coun-
tries seeking to reduce their unemployment rates.
Our analysis suggests that the reforms, particularly
wage moderation, explain most of the turnaround in the
Netherlands’unemployment rate and at least part of the
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Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; 
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improvement in Ireland’s. Two features of the reforms
emerge as especially important in improving labor 
market performance. First, the changes were consen-
sual, the product of agreements between employers,
unions, and the government. Second, the changes were
part of a comprehensive package combining wage
restraints with other initiatives that helped soften the
impact of the restraints on workers’net earnings. 
We conclude that adopting similar reforms could
help other European countries reduce unemployment.
Nevertheless, the gains would most likely fall short 
of those seen in Ireland and the Netherlands. Many 
of the advances brought about by the Irish and 
Dutch reforms—such as the increased participation of
women in the workforce—had occurred earlier in other
European countries. Thus, the scope for improvement in
the unemployment rates in these countries would
undoubtedly be smaller. 
Europe’s Chronic High Unemployment
The European unemployment rate began to climb in the
mid-1970s and hit 10 percent by the mid-1980s (Chart 1).
For eighteen of the past twenty years, it has ranged
between 8 and 11 percent. The persistence of the high rate
sets Europe’s experience apart from that of the United
States. The U.S. rate also rose in the mid-1970s and early
1980s, but after peaking at 9.7 percent in 1982, it fell more
or less steadily to its current level of about 4.5 percent.
Most economists agree on the sequence of events
that has brought about Europe’s sustained high unem-
ployment.1 In the prevailing view, the initial rise in the
rate was triggered by a series of adverse shocks—two
sharp hikes in oil prices, a slowdown in productivity
growth beginning in the early 1970s, and high real
interest rates in the 1980s. Once these shocks subsided,
certain institutional features of the European labor mar-
kets kept unemployment rates from falling. These features
include extensive regulations on wage bargaining,
working hours, part-time employment, and dismissals,
as well as generous unemployment insurance systems.
Such regulations can encourage high unemployment
rates by reducing the flow of workers in and out of
unemployment.2 For example, unemployed workers
may find that rules limiting part-time work prevent
them from securing some form of employment.
Moreover, workers who have been laid off may find that
generous unemployment benefits weaken their resolve
to return to work. Of course, the longer such workers
are unemployed, the more likely they are to lose their
skills and to become discouraged. And as time passes,
employers will increasingly view them as risky to hire.
This chain of consequences suggests the way in which
extensive regulations on work and wages can foster
inflexible labor markets and perpetuate unemployment.
Long-term unemployment, in turn, will reduce an
economy’s ability to adjust quickly to shocks. Normally,
an economy that experiences higher unemployment will
see its wages fall. When wages drop, hiring activity
accelerates and the unemployment rate declines.
However, when a large percentage of unemployed work-
ers become “long-term unemployed,” lower wages are
often not enough to induce firms to overcome their 
misgivings about such workers and give them jobs.
Consequently, the economy becomes caught in an
unemployment “trap.”3
The Performance of the Irish and Dutch Labor Markets
Given Europe’s record of persistent high unemploy-
ment, the achievement of Ireland and the Netherlands in
reducing their unemployment rates is remarkable. In
1987, Ireland’s unemployment rate was 17.5 percent,
far higher than the European average of 10.0 percent.
By 2000, Ireland had cut its rate to 4.2 percent. The
turnaround in the Netherlands’ unemployment rate was
similarly impressive: the rate dropped from a high of 
11.0 percent in 1983 to 2.8 percent in 2000. The unem-
ployment rate in the European Union as a whole
improved far less, receding from its mid-1980s peak of
10.3 percent to 8.2 percent in 2000. 
Another indicator of the labor market recovery in
Ireland and the Netherlands is the decline in nonem-
ployment (Chart 2). A broader measure than the unem-
ployment rate, the nonemployment rate captures the
percentage of the working-age population that is either
unemployed or “not in the labor force.”4 People not in
the labor force are those who are not working and not
actively looking for work—a group that includes home-
makers, students, and so-called discouraged workers. 
For much of the 1980s, Irish and Dutch nonemploy-
ment rates exceeded the European average by about 
10 percentage points. Since then, nonemployment in













Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;
authors’ calculations.
Note: Nonemployment rate = (the unemployed + those not in the labor 
force) / (the employed + the unemployed + those not in the labor force).Ireland and the Netherlands has fallen roughly 15 per-
centage points to about 35 percent in 2000, with most
of the decline occurring after 1993. This improvement
is largely attributable to increased labor force participa-
tion rates.5 The movement of women from the home to
the workplace accounted for much of the growth in
labor force participation in both countries. 
In Ireland, the labor market turnaround has also
encouraged a return migration of workers from the
United Kingdom and other countries. Almost all of
these workers have come back to jobs, and they now
contribute more than 0.6 percentage point to annual Irish
labor force growth, reinforcing the declines in unem-
ployment and nonemployment (OECD 1999, p. 72).
Significantly, the dramatic improvement in the Irish
and Dutch labor markets since the mid-1980s has coin-
cided with a series of far-reaching labor market reforms
in both countries. In the next two sections, we examine
these reforms and assess their contribution to the turn-
around in the countries’unemployment rates.
Labor Market Reforms in Ireland
Spurred by a 17 percent unemployment rate, wage
growth that showed little sign of easing, and anemic
GDP growth, Ireland began a series of labor market
reforms in the late 1980s.6 The reforms included limits
on wage increases, reductions in income taxes, a cut-
back in unemployment benefits, and the adoption of 
“active labor market policies”—policies favoring pub-
lic job training and placement programs. The recovery
that followed took place in two stages. The first stage,
beginning at the end of the decade and continuing until
1993, involved a stabilization of the labor market and a
modest decrease in the unemployment rate. The second
stage, extending from 1993 to the present, saw a spec-
tacular employment boom.
Wage Moderation
The most significant initiative in the early period was a
three-year national wage pact, the Programme for
National Recovery. Supported by employers, trade
unions, and the government, the pact limited annual
wage increases to 2.5 percent between 1988 and 1990.
As part of the pact, the government agreed to offset the
limits on wages by cutting income taxes and increasing
spending for welfare, health, and housing services.
Shortly after the program was launched, the number of
workdays lost to strikes fell sharply and business confi-
dence improved. Over time, unemployment declined
and GDP growth rose. The success of this pact led to
four subsequent pacts, and they appear to have become
an enduring feature of the Irish labor market landscape.7
Income Tax Reductions
In the early 1980s, Ireland’s “tax wedge”—the difference
between the cost of a worker to the employer and the net
wage received by the worker—was the fourth highest in
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). In accordance with the Irish
national wage pacts, taxes were reduced beginning in
1987, with the marginal rate falling from 35 percent to
29 percent by 1991 in the lowest income bracket, and
from 58 percent to 48 percent in the highest bracket. As a
result, the average tax burden posed by income and
social security taxes fell from 35 percent in 1987 to 
31 percent in 1994, and fell further to 29 percent in 1996.
By 1994, the tax wedge was below the OECD average.8
Tightening of Unemployment Benefits
Other reforms have restricted the size and availability
of unemployment benefits. The replacement rate—the
ratio of unemployment benefits to after-tax wage
income—was reduced from a high of 77 percent to 
64 percent in 1994, a level below the OECD average.9
The Irish welfare system traditionally provided “more
or less permanent support for the unemployed” with no
maximum duration for unemployment assistance.10 In
recent years, however, recipients in some age groups
have been required to register in a public employment
or training program if they wish to continue to receive
benefits after their first six months on the rolls.11
Active Labor Market Policies
In the 1990s, the Irish government increased spending
on programs designed to mobilize the labor supply,
improve job skills, and increase the efficiency of labor
markets. The share of GDP spent on such programs
rose from 1.4 percent in 1991 to 1.8 percent in 1995, a
level that is twice the OECD average.12 Community
Employment, Ireland’s largest program, targets older
people who have been unemployed for long periods.
This program provided 40,000 part-time jobs in 1995,
equivalent to 3 percent of total employment.
Effect of the Reforms
Academic studies of labor market reforms suggest that
a number of these initiatives brought significant bene-
fits. Blanchard (2000) identifies wage moderation as
the key reform in Ireland because it allowed productiv-
ity to grow faster than wages, a development that
encouraged employers to increase hiring. Gains in pro-
ductivity also boosted firms’profit margins, prompting
employers to step up their investment spending.
Studying a broad group of European countries, Nickell
(1997) finds evidence that income tax reductions have
increased the incentive to work and that limits on the
duration of benefits may have significantly lowered
unemployment. Reforms that have not been found to be
useful in reducing unemployment are the job training
and placement programs.13
The effectiveness of Ireland’s wage moderation initia-
tive owes much to the consensual nature of the wage
pacts. Because the trade unions worked with employers
and the government to formulate agreements that would
3have the backing of all parties, the risks of reneging 
were minimized. Also contributing to the success of the
initiative was the decision to include provisions for tax
cuts and enhanced health and housing services in the
wage pacts. By offsetting the adverse effects that wage
restraints would have on worker earnings, these provi-
sions eased the implementation of the wage agreements.14
Although the evidence that Ireland’s reforms were
effective is strong, existing research does not directly
consider the extent to which the reforms could be
responsible for the post-1993 employment boom.
Certainly, the timing of the reforms makes it difficult to
attribute much of the boom to them. Wage moderation
began in 1987 and has stayed fairly constant in the
ensuing three-year pacts. The most ambitious income
tax cuts occurred in the late 1980s, and subsequent
reductions have been more moderate. Thus, it seems
reasonable to conclude that these reforms were instru-
mental in producing the first phase of the labor market
turnaround in the late 1980s and early 1990s but con-
tributed less to the rapid employment growth after 1993.
Of course, one might take the “longer” view that the
reforms laid the groundwork for the post-1993 boom.
Nevertheless, if we adopt this perspective, then we must
consider how other early reforms may have created the
right conditions for the post-1993 employment surge. 
Consider, for example, the long-term effects of the
1967 legislation mandating free secondary education.15 In
1965, only 50 percent of 15-year-olds and 25 percent of
17-year-olds were in school full-time; by 1992, 100 per-
cent of 15-year-olds and 66 percent of 17-year-olds were
full-time students. The most recent statistics suggest 
that 82 percent of the population now complete upper 
secondary level education. Since workers who are more
highly educated tend to have lower unemployment rates,
the upgrading of education levels could well have played
a role in the employment boom of the 1990s. 
Moreover, education reform may have contributed to
the recent explosion in foreign direct investment, a
development that the OECD has called “possibly the
most important causal influence” on Ireland’s employ-
ment boom.16 Improvements in the education level of
the workforce may have helped persuade foreign firms
to establish operations in Ireland during the post-1993
period. These firms have become leading employers 
in the country, accounting for 47 percent of Ireland’s
manufacturing jobs alone (OECD 1999, p. 62).
Labor Market Reforms in the Netherlands
The turnaround in the Dutch labor market began with
the so-called Wassenaar Agreement of November 5,
1982.17 The agreement, reached through negotiations
between the government, unions, and employers, fol-
lowed a period of deterioration when wages were grow-
ing significantly faster than productivity. Rapid wage
growth had hurt firm profitability, prompting employ-
ers to reduce investment spending and cut back on new
hiring. The Wassenaar Agreement laid the foundations
for a labor market recovery by limiting wage increases,
tightening unemployment benefits, and removing barri-
ers to part-time work.
Wage Moderation
Under the terms of the agreement, the linking of wage
increases to inflation increases was eliminated. The
minimum wage was first frozen in nominal terms, then
reduced in subsequent years, resulting in an overall cut
of 22 percent in real, or inflation-adjusted, terms by
1997. The minimum wage also declined relative to the
average wage. Together, these changes have kept gross
average wages constant in real terms since the early
1980s—an outcome that contrasts sharply with the 
25 percent increase in wages during the 1970s. The
steadiness of real wages has meant that subsequent pro-
ductivity gains have lowered the cost of labor, thereby
restoring firms’profitability and ability to invest. 
Reinforcing the reduction in labor costs was a cut in
the tax that firms pay for each worker, especially for
low-wage workers. For example, the tax wedge for 
minimum-wage workers dropped from 30 percent in 
the 1980s to 15 percent in 1998. The negative effect of
wage moderation on workers’earnings was offset by tax
cuts, which pushed the real after-tax wage up 14.8 per-
cent between 1983 and 1998.
Tightening of Unemployment Benefits
The unemployment insurance system was significantly
curtailed in 1986-87. The duration of benefits was
reduced from thirty to six months for younger workers
and the replacement rate was lowered from 80 to 70 per-
cent. Because minimum benefits are linked to the mini-
mum wage, lowering the minimum wage reduced the
minimum benefit. By 1998, the minimum benefit had
been pared to 60 percent of the average wage, a decline
of 9 percentage points from the early 1980s. In addition,
in 1995 the government tightened the eligibility stan-
dards for benefits, requiring a longer period of employ-
ment. Recipients are also now expected to accept a
“suitable” job offer; those who refuse such offers
receive reduced benefits. Finally, what constitutes a
suitable offer is interpreted more liberally for recipients
who have had relatively long unemployment spells—a
change in the rules that is designed to induce the unem-
ployed to broaden their job search as time passes.
Removal of Barriers to Part-Time Work
The Wassenaar Agreement eased rules on part-time
work. Unions waived their opposition to part-time
work, and part-time employees became eligible for 
full social security benefits, including unemployment 
insurance and disability insurance. The lowering of 
barriers to part-time work contributed to a large influx
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nonemployment rate among women fell 17 percentage
points between 1979 and 1998, while it remained steady
among men. The employment gains of Dutch women
were concentrated in part-time jobs: between 1983 and
1998, the percentage of women workers holding part-
time jobs rose from 50 to 68 percent.18
Effect of the Reforms
The Wassenaar Agreement was quickly followed by a
strong recovery of the labor market, suggesting that the
reforms precipitated the turnaround. Quantitative studies
by Nickell and van Ours (2000) and others point to wage
moderation as the chief cause of the recovery. Once
again, the effectiveness of the wage moderation initiative
stemmed in part from the support it enjoyed from all 
parties—the unions, the employers, and the government.
Moreover, the inclusion of tax cuts in the wage pact 
tempered the effects of the wage restraints and encour-
aged acceptance of the reforms.
The contribution of unemployment insurance reform
to the improvement in the Dutch labor market is more
difficult to assess. The benefits of this reform are not
easily measured. However, a similar reform of the
Dutch disability system, undertaken between 1985 and
1987, has had only limited success. Although the gov-
ernment lowered the replacement rate for benefits and
required recipients to meet a more stringent definition
of disability, the share of the working-age population
receiving disability benefits has remained steady at
about 8 percent since the early 1980s.
The value of removing barriers to part-time work
would seem to be much less ambigious. This reform has
helped bring about a substantial increase in the labor
force participation of Dutch women since the early
1980s. Nevertheless, larger cultural changes must also
be credited with encouraging women to work. These
cultural changes had taken effect in other European
countries much earlier, and the Netherlands was in a
sense simply “catching up” with the rest of Europe.
Still, it appears that the Netherlands’ progress in this
area was facilitated by the reforms. 
Conclusion
During the past two decades, Ireland and the
Netherlands have achieved dramatic labor market
improvements after undertaking wide-ranging reforms.
Academic research has shown that the reforms—in 
particular, wage moderation—can explain almost all of
the Netherlands’turnaround since the mid-1980s, and at
least the first phase of Ireland’s recovery.19
The effectiveness of the reforms prompts us to ask
whether other European countries might benefit from
following the example of Ireland and the Netherlands.
The evidence suggests that wage moderation could
indeed help lower unemployment rates elsewhere in
Europe. Such a strategy is most likely to be successful
if it has the backing of the government, trade unions,
and employers and if limits on wage growth are accom-
panied by tax cuts or other measures that soften the 
negative effects on worker earnings. 
Nevertheless, while other European countries could
improve their labor market performance by following
the Dutch and Irish lead, they will probably not achieve
the same radical reduction in their unemployment rates.
Many of the reforms in Ireland and the Netherlands
simply enabled these countries to catch up to the rest of
the European Union. Other European countries had
already seen a marked increase in the labor force partici-
pation of women, and they had long maintained much
lower rates of nonemployment than Ireland and the
Netherlands.20 Thus, European countries that enact
labor market reforms modeled on those in Ireland and
the Netherlands are likely to reap more modest rewards.
Notes
1. See, for example, Blanchard (2000), Blanchard and Wolfers
(1999), IMF (1999), and Nickell (1997). 
2. See Blanchard (2000) and Blanchard and Portugal (2001).
3. Research has shown that labor market regulations do not neces-
sarily increase unemployment in the absence of shocks, but 
substantially hinder the ability of the economy to adjust to shocks.
See Balakrishnan and Michelacci (2001) and IMF (1999).
4. The nonemployment rate = (the unemployed + those not in the
labor force) / (the employed + the unemployed + those not in the
labor force). This measure is particularly useful because it corrects
for differences in the criteria used by various countries to identify
those people actively looking for work.
5. The participation rate measures the labor force (the employed +
the unemployed) as a percentage of the working age population (the
employed + the unemployed + those not in the labor force). 
6. Our discussion of Ireland’s labor market reforms draws heavily
on OECD sources (OECD 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997a, 1999). 
7. The pacts were the Programme for Economic and Social
Progress (increases of 3.75 percent for 1991-93), the Programme for
Competitiveness and Work (increases of 2 percent in 1994, 2.5 per-
cent in 1995, and 3.5 percent in 1996), the Partnership 2000
(increases of 7.25 percent for 1997-99), and the Programme for
Prosperity and Fairness (increases of 15.5 percent for 2000-2003). 
8. In 1998, the lowest and highest marginal rates were reduced to
24 and 46 percent, respectively, putting Ireland’s tax wedge even
further below the OECD average.
9. The replacement rate cited is for a married worker who has two
children and earns the average industrial wage. 
10. See OECD (1993, p. 61; 1997a, p. 81).
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11. The requirement, applied first to 18- and 19-year-olds in 1996,
generated immediate results: “twenty-eight percent were struck off
the rolls either because of a voluntary departure or because they had
accepted a job or training place” (OECD 1999, p. 127). In 1998, the
requirement was extended to recipients in certain other age groups,
further reducing the unemployment rolls.
12. Spending on these programs has fallen recently; they accounted
for 1.5 percent of GDP in 1998.
13. The European Social Fund Evaluation Unit judged the
Community Employment program to be particularly weak “in terms
of progression to employment and training certification” (OECD
1999, p. 129).
14. This is a particularly important point given the political sensi-
tivity of changes to the welfare state. See IMF (1999, p. 34) and
Watson et al. (1999, p. 41). Indeed, partial reforms may have 
unintended adverse effects if they merely shift distortions to other
margins of the labor market. See Blanchard and Landier (2000). 
15. See Barry (1999), IMF (2000), and OECD (1999).
16. FDI inflows have increased dramatically, rising from an average
of less than $0.14 billion per year in the 1980s to an average of more
than $1.1 billion per year in the 1990s (OECD 1999, p. 53; authors’
calculations). Foreign-owned manufacturing firms now account for
about 30 percent of GDP (OECD 1999, p. 62). 
17. Our discussion of the Dutch reforms is based on Blanchard
(2000), Nickell and van Ours (2000), and Watson et al. (1999).
18. In the European Union as a whole, the percentage of women
holding part-time jobs rose only 7 percentage points—from 26 to 
33 percent—over the same period. Note that the increase in part-
time employment among Dutch women reflected their choice and
was not the outcome of a shortage of full-time positions (OECD
1997b, p. 33).
19. Wage moderation is the most visible effect of a structural
change in the bargaining process between unions and employers.
When unions broaden their focus to include the unemployed, they
put relatively less emphasis on securing wage increases for the
employed workers they represent and more emphasis on promoting
the hiring of the unemployed. This shift in focus was a key compo-
nent of the agreements reached in Ireland and the Netherlands.
20. See Chart 2. 
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